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STATE OF UTAH 
F R E D H . B U H L E R , 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
V E R L STONE, Utah County 
Commissioner, MACK H O L L E Y , 
Utah County Sheriff, and 
U T A H COUNTY, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
B R I E F OF P L A I N T I F F - A P P E L L A N T 
N A T U R E OF T H E CASE 
This is an action arising from an alleged violation 
of Utah County Ordinance 1970-1 which amended 
Title 3 of the Revised Ordinances of Utah County 1956 
relating to health and sanitation by adding Chapter 13 
entitled "Inspection and Cleaning of Real Property." 
D I S P O S I T I O N I N T H E L O W E R COURT 
This matter was tried without a jury on September 
Case No. 
13715 
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10, 1973. On April 29, 1974, a judgment was entered 
upholding the provisions of Ordinance 1970-1 as con-
stitutional. The court held that the ordinance was nei-
ther vague nor was it uncertain. The court further held 
that the plaintiff had violated the ordinance by accumu-
lating vehicles as well as other material upon his prop-
erty and that he had been given proper notice to clean 
up his property. 
R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L 
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the court's ruling that 
Utah County Ordinance 1970-1 is constitutional. Plain-
tiff contends the ordinance is unconstitutional because 
of its vagueness and because the ordinance provides for 
no hearing prior to depriving one of property which 
is a denial of due process. 
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
Fred L. Buhler, the plaintiff, is a farmer and 
steel worker residing in Highland, Utah. (Tr. 9) H e 
owns approximately 40 acres and leases an additional 
160 acres of farm land. (Tr. 44) Upon this farm he 
stores personal property consisting of automobiles, some 
of which are antiques (Tr. 12) and others of a vintage 
nature. (Tr. 12) He has purchased, traded and acquired 
approximately 261 vehicles. (Tr. 9, 11) Mr. Buhler 
testified that in his opinion the automobiles are worth 
$51,815.00. (Tr. 11) Boyd Stice, an automobile dealer 
in Utah County since 1936, (Tr. 49) valued eleven of 
the vehicles at $3,250.00 (Tr. 51) He stated, under 
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cross examination, that the balance of the vehicles (251) 
would each be worth a minimum of $100. (Tr. 58) In 
Mr. Stice's opinion, therefore, the 261 vehicles have a 
total value approximating $28,000.00. 
These automobiles are presently stored on plain-
tiff's farm. (Tr. 9) The Utah County Commission 
has attempted to impound and remove them without 
compensating the plaintiff because he failed to conform 
to Utah County Ordinance 1970-1. The Commission 
contends these stored automobiles violate Section 3-13-3 
of the ordinance inasmuch as they are "unsightly." How-
ever a petition signed by 86 neighbors of the plaintiff 
did not find the stored automobiles "unsightly." (Exh. 
6) 
A formal letter of the Commission on March 6, 
1973, (Exh. 2) informed the plaintiff the problem 
had to be corrected within 30 days. The plaintiff, after 
meeting with the Commission on April 26, 1973, re-
ceived another letter from the Commission dated May 
8,1973, (Exh. 3) confirming an agreement to give plain-
tiff until June 25, 1973, to comply. At no time in this 
controversy was plaintiff granted a meaningful hearing. 
On July 6, 1973, (Exh. 4) plaintiff was informed 
that he must remove all personal items from the cars 
by July 11, 1973, as the county "was making prepara-
tions to clean up the property." However plaintiff 
managed to obtain a Temporary Restraining Order on 
July 13,1973, which prevented the county from hauling 
the cars away. Later on July 20,1973, plaintiff obtained 
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a preliminary injunction which enjoined Utah County 
from enforcing Title 3 of the Revised Ordinance until 
the constitutionality of the ordinance had been deter-
mined. On November 27, 1973, the court entered a 
memorandum ruling upholding the ordinance. Later 
the District Court dissolved the injunction, dismissed 
plaintiff's complaint and upheld the constitutionality 
of the ordinance. The plaintiff appeals from this ruling. 
The Utah County Commission contends the auto-
mobiles of the plaintiff should be removed pursuant to 
Ordinance 1970-1. The Commission asserts this ordin-
ance is constitutional and was properly enacted under 
the general police power vested in Utah County. Plain-
tiff, on the contrary, claims the ordinance is unconstitu-
tional because if his cars are impounded and removed 
pursuant to the ordinance then he will be deprived of 
property, valued at $28,000.00, without due process of 
law. 
A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I 
C O N S T I T U T I O N A L R E S T R A I N T S 
I M P O S E D BY T H E F E D E R A L CON-
S T I T U T I O N CAN'T B E CIRCUM-
V E N T E D BY U T A H COUNTY I N I T S 
E X E R C I S E OF P O L I C E P O W E R 
I t is elementary that county ordinances, such as 
the Utah County Ordinance in dispute, derive their 
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authority from the state government and must not be 
repugnant to either the federal or state constitutions. 
See Sailors v. Board of Education, 387 U.S. 105 
(1967) 
Plaintiff maintains that Utah County Ordinance 
1970-1 violates the Federal Constitutional requirements 
of due process of law. The ordinance is undoubtedly an 
exercise by Utah County of its police power and plain-
tiff is fully aware of the difficulty of formulating any 
constitutional limitations on such an exercise of police 
power. These difficulties, as well as the limitations 
on the exercise of the police power, are noted in 16 
Am.Jur.2di at 571, 
The police power is commonly described 
as the least limitable of governmental powers. 
It is not, despite certain language to be found 
in some decisions, an unlimited power, but its 
limitations have never been drawn with exact-
ness, and its boundary line cannot be deter-
mined by any general formula in advance, (em-
phasis added) 
Despite the difficulty of prescribing limitations 
to the police power, nevertheless a constitutional right 
can not be abridged by legislation under the guise of a 
police regulation. See Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 
294 U.S. 550 (1935). The same idea is expressed in 
56 Am.Jur. 2d at 474, 
The police power of a municipality, broad 
as it may be, cannot justify the passage of a 
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law or ordinance which runs counter to any of 
the limitations of the Federal Constitution. 
Utah County labels this ordmance a health measure. 
However, the constitutional validity of any ordinance 
is determined by its practical operation and effect and 
not by its title. If under the terms of this county ordin-
ance an individual can be deprived of property without 
any hearing or if some provision is so vague that one 
must necessarily guess at its meaning then it matters 
not what the county calls it because the ordinance is 
unconstitutional. 
Plaintiff reminds the court that by virtue of the 
supremacy clause of the Federal Constiution that state 
action, such as this county ordinance, must give way 
when in conflict with the Federal Constitution. The 
power of a municipality although extremely broad can't 
justify the passage of an ordinance which runs counter 
to any limitations of the Federal Constitution. See 
Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223 (1904); Daly v. 
Elton, 195 U.S. 242 (1904) 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Con-
stitution prevents any action by a state which would 
deprive a person of his property without due process of 
law. The purpose of the due process clause it to insure 
the fair and orderly administration of the laws. This 
protection extends to one's rights in the broadest sense 
of the term. In spite of the fundamental importance of 
the term, the phrase is difficult to define. 16 Am.Jur. 
2d at 553 states, 
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The extent to which constitutional limita-
tions upon governmental power in general 
operate to inhibit the exercise of the police 
power is a most difficult matter, involving in-
tricate questions and highly abstract ideas . . . 
Consonant with their reluctance to formulate 
any ironclad definition of the police power, or 
announce any rigid boundaries to its exercise, 
the courts have dealt with the issue of police 
power as affected by constitutional require-
ments on a case by case basis . . . . (emphasis 
added) 
Plaintiff contends that the constitutionality of this 
ordinance must be determined on the basis of the circum-
stances of this particular fact pattern and not on the 
basis of any sweeping generalizations about the extent 
of police power. The effect of enforcement of this ordi-
nance is a denial of plaintiff's right to "due process of 
law." The Federal Constitutional provision prohibiting 
any denial of "due process of law" takes precedence 
over any Utah County Ordinance. 
P O I N T I I 
U T A H COUNTY O R D I N A N C E 1970-1 
IS U N C O N S T I T U T I O N A L B E C A U S E 
I T F A I L S TO P R O V I D E FOR A 
M E A N I N G F U L H E A R I N G P R I O R 
TO D E P R I V I N G ONE OF H I S PROP-
E R T Y 
I t is not necessary for plaintiff to belabor the im-
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portance of the concept of "due process of law." The 
Utah Supreme Court in Thompson v. Harris, 197 Utah 
99, 152 P.2d 91 (1944) appropriately said of "due 
process of law" that, 
I t includes or perhaps is coterminous with 
those 'principles of justice so rooted in the tra-
ditions and conscience of our people as to be 
ranked as fundamental/ (emphasis added) 
The United States Supreme Court in Brock v. 
North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424 (1953) said, 
"Due process is the very essence of the 
scheme of ordered justice." 
An examination of Utah County Ordinance 1970-1 
discloses absolutely no provision providing for any 
hearing before an alleged violator is deprived of his 
property. Under the county ordinance the determination 
of whether an item is "unsightly," making it necessary 
to remove the item from the premises, is left to the sole 
discretion of Utah County who hires employees "to 
determine whether the owner of such property are com-
plying with the provisions of this Chapter." The ordi-
nance thus gives carte blanche authority to the County 
Commission to remove and destroy property that in 
their unchecked opinion is "unsightly." 
The defendants had ample opportunity to introduce 
evidence that the ordinance in dispute contains any 
provision providing for a meaningful hearing before 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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one is deprived of his property. The defendants utterly 
failed to produce such evidence because obviously there 
exists no such provision in the ordinance. 
The importance of such a meaningful hearing prior 
to depriving one of his property has recently been re-
affirmed by the United States Supreme Court in 
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) which involved 
a challenge to the constitutionality of the pre-judgment 
replevin provisions of Florida and Pennsylvania law. 
Both provisions permitted a private party without a 
hearing or prior notice to the other party to obtain a 
prejudgment writ of replevin through a summary pro-
cess of ex parte application to a court clerk upon posting 
a bond for double the value of the property seized. The 
United States Supreme Court said, 
The constitutional right to be heard is a 
basic aspect of the duty of government to 
follow a fair process of decision making when 
it acts to deprive a person of his possessions. 
The purpose of this requirement is not only 
to ensure abstract fair play to the individual. 
Its purpose, more particularly, is to protect 
his use and possession of property from arbi-
trary encrouchment—to minimize substan-
tively unfair or mistaken depriviations of 
property. 
If the right to notice and a hearing is to 
serve its full purpose, then, it is clear that it 
must be granted at a time when the deprivation 
can still be prevented. At a later hearing, an 
individual's possessions can be returned to him 
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if they were unfairly or mistakenly taken in 
the first place. Damages may even be awarded 
to him for the wrongful deprivation. But no 
later hearing and no damage awarded can undo 
the fact that the arbitrary taking that was 
subject to the right of procedural due process 
has already occurred. 
This is no new principle of constitutional 
law. The right to a prior hearing has long been 
recognized by this Court under the Fourteenth 
and Fifth Amendments. Although the Court 
has held that due process tolerates variances 
in the form of a hearing "appropriate to the 
nature of the case," Mullane v. Central Han-
over Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313, and "depend-
ing upon the importance of the interests in-
volved and the nature of the subsequent pro-
ceedings [if any]," Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 
U.S. 371, 378, the Court has traditionally in-
sisted that, whatever its form, opportunity for 
that hearing must be provided before the de-
privation at issue takes effect. E. g., Bell v. 
Bur son, 402 U.S. 535, 542; Wisconsin v. Con-
stantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437; Goldberg v. 
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254; Armstrong v. Manzo, 
380 U.S., at 551; Mullane v. Central Hanover 
Tr. Co., supra, at 313; Opp Cotton Mills v. 
Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 152-153; United 
States v. Illinois Central R. Co., 291 U.S. 
457, 463; Londoner v. City & County of Den-
^ , 2 1 0 ^ 8 . 3 7 3 , 3 8 5 - 3 8 6 . 
But it is now well settled that a temp-
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orary, nonfinal deprivation of property is none-
theless a "deprivation" in the terms of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Sniadach v. Family 
Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337; Bell v. Burson, 
402 U.S. 535. 
Plaintiff submits that there was uncontroverted 
testimony at trial that the value of the automobiles 
stored on plaintiff's property approximated $28,000.00. 
A thorough examination of the provisions of this county 
ordinance reveals that it contains no provision whatso-
ever granting any type of meaningful hearing prior to 
depriving a person of his property. This plaintiff con-
tends under the authority of Fuentes and Sniadach 
is constitutionally intolerable. 
P O I N T I I I 
T H E O R D I N A N C E IS U N C O N S T I T U -
T I O N A L L Y V A G U E B E C A U S E M E N 
OF C O M P E T E N T I N T E L L I G E N C E 
MUST N E C E S S A R I L Y G U E S S A T I T S 
M E A N I N G 
The standard by which to judge when the words 
in an ordinance are so vague so as to render it unconsti-
tutional was stated by the Utah Supreme Court in 
State v. Packard, 122 Utah 410 250 P.2d 581 (1952), 
This court a number of times has ap-
plied the principle which is well stated in the 
case of Connally v. General Construction Co., 
269 U.S. 385, 46 S.Ct. 126, 127, 70 L.Ed. 322, 
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"* * * a statute which either forbids or requires 
the doing of an act in terms so vague that men 
of common intelligence must necessarily guess 
at its meaning and differ as to its application 
violates the first essential of due process of 
law. * * *" 
See also Watson v. Board of Regents of University of 
Colorado, 512 P.2d 1162 (1973); State v. Pigge, 79 
Fla. 529 P.2d 703 (1958) ; Jacobsen v. Board of Criro-
practic Examiners, 337 P.2d 233 (1959). 
The standard of voidness for uncertainity was stated 
at 56 Am.Jur. 2d at 394, 
I t is a well-recognized principle of law 
that an ordinance must be definite and certain. 
Certainly is necessary in order for an ordinance 
to meet the test of reasonableness. There is 
no hard-and-fast rule determining whether any 
ordinance is void for indefiniteness, and the 
rule of reason must be applied to every case 
as it arises. An ordinance, such as one of a 
regulatory or prohibitory nature must be clear, 
definite, and certain, so that an average man 
should be able with due care, after reading it, 
to understand and ascertain whether he will 
incur a penalty for particular acts or courses 
of conduct. If he cannot reach such a determi-
nation from examination of an ordinance, it 
is void for uncertainty, (emphasis added) 
The case of Jones v. Logan City Corporation, 19 
Utah 2d 169, 428 P.2d 160 (1967) involved an action 
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attempting to restrain Logan City from destroying 
plaintiff's home. The City Board of Condemnation after 
a hearing and inspection of the building made a finding 
that it constituted a menace to public safety and should 
therefore be demolished. The Utah Supreme Court said 
an ordinance must provide standards, 
While the statute above mentioned grants 
to cities the power to declare what shall be a 
nuisance, the ordinance before us does not in 
fact define what a nuisance is. Ordinance No. 
120 above referred to, which grants to the 
Board of Condemnation the right to determine 
whether any building constitutes a menace to 
public health or public safety does not provide 
standards on which the Board can base its 
finding as to what is or what is not a menace 
to public health or public safety. I t would 
appear that the ordinance imposes upon the 
Board of Condemnation quasi-judicial func-
tions without standards or guidelines to govern 
the Board in its determination, (emphasis 
added) 
Section 3-13-4 of the Utah County ordinance states 
that it is unlawful for anyone to allow certain enumer-
ated items such as abandoned vehicles to be left upon 
ones property "whenever said items shall be unsightly 
and in public views." Section 3-13-2 of the ordinance 
requires that one remove any "unsightly deleterious 
objects or structures upon notice from Utah County." 
These are the words that plaintiff maintains are vague. 
Although Logan City Corporation, supra dealt with 
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an alleged nuisance and the county ordinance in contro-
versy deals ostensibly with health and sanitation yet 
ascertainable standards in both are constitutionally in-
dispensible. Plaintiff contends there exists not even 
the remotest definite standard that Utah County could 
possibly apply in order to determine whether the auto-
mobiles left on Mr. Buhler's property are "unsightly." 
As a direct consequence of the vagueness of this ordi-
nance it is impossible for Utah County to formulate 
any consistent standard in order to determine what is 
"unsightly." This renders enforcement entirely capri-
cious and arbitrary. 
Not only is the word "unsightly" unclear but the 
general purpose of the ordinance is subject to serious 
ambiguity. For example Section 10 of the ordinance 
provides for an examination and inspection by the Board 
of Health. One would suppose from this that the ordi-
nance could be categorized as a health ordinance, how-
ever, defendants in their trial brief persisted in treating 
the ordinance as one of nuisance abatement. 
Plaintiff argues that the word "unsightly" is so 
vague that persons are unable to ascertain what conduct 
conforms to its requirements; that the word "unsightly" 
is so vague and susceptible to multiple interpretations 
and meanings that it is utterly impossible for the Utah 
County officials charged with enforcing this ordinance 
to formulate any definite standards; and that the im-
possibility of definite standards renders enforcement 
wholly arbitrary, unreasonable and capricious. This 
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county ordinance is unconstitutional because its pro-
visions are "so vague that men of ordinary intelligence 
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differing 
applications." 
P O I N T IV 
T H E A T T E M P T E D REMOVAL OF 
P L A I N T I F F S A U T O M O B I L E S W A S 
M O T I V A T E D BY AN A E S T H E T I C 
S T A N D A R D W H I C H IS SO SUBJEC-
T I V E AS TO R E N D E R T H E ORDI-
N A N C E U N C O N S T I T U T I O N A L 
Plaintiff submits that the emphasis placed upon 
the removal of items from property that are 'unsightly" 
makes the County ordinance one of enhancing the 
"beauty" of the surroundings. Obviously an aesthetic 
standard is completely impractical as the source of any 
definite standard to be imposed as such by a govern-
mental unit for the restriction or destruction of property 
rights. This idea is noted in 16 Am.Jur. 2d at 569, 
It has always been a well-settled rule, ac-
cepted even by courts which have partially 
questioned its soundness in relation to modern 
social conditions that the state cannot limit or 
restrict the use which a person may make of 
his property under the guise of the police 
power, where the exercise of such power would 
be warranted solely on aesthetic considerations. 
Among other reasons for this principle, it has 
been stated that only those police measures 
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having for their object the safety and welfare 
of the public justify restricting the use of 
property by its owner, that any other stand-
ard is impossible to establish, and that aesthetic 
considerations are a matter of luxury and 
indulgence, rather than of necessity, whereas 
it is necessity alone which justifies the exercise 
of the police power to take private property 
without compensation, (emphasis added) 
The court in Young stown v. Kahn Bros. Bldg. Co., 112 
Ohio 654,148 N.E. 842 (1925) stated, 
The world would be at continual seesaw 
if aesthetic considerations were permitted to 
govern the use of the police power. We are 
therefore remitted to the proposition that the 
police power is based upon public necessity, 
and that the public health, morals, or safety, 
and not merely aesthetic interest, but must be 
in danger in order to justify its use. 
Obviously "unsightly" is a highly subjective and 
relative term. The neighbors of the plaintiff failed to 
find these cars stored on his property "unsightly." On 
the contrary the county officials, charged with enforc-
ing the ordinance, found them "unsightly." Plaintiff 
contends the term "unsightly" imposes an aesthetic 
standard which being extremely subjective, renders the 
ordinance unconstitutional. The testimony at trial so 
indicated. 
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CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff concludes, that Utah County Ordinance 
1970-1 is unconstitutional because it fails to provide for 
any meaningful hearing prior to being deprived of 
property. The provision of the ordinance allowing re-
moval of property when it is found to be "unsightly" 
is unconstitutionally vague because men of 
ordinary intelligence must necessarily guess 
at its meaning. Therefore plaintiff asks 
for a ruling that Utah County Ordinance 
1970-1 violates the Federal Constitution. 
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